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BAR BRIEFS
A BRIEF SURVEY OF COURT DECISIONS
CONSTRUING THE NORTH DAKOTA BILL OF RIGHTS
By Prof. Ross C. Tisdale
(Continued from last issue)
SECTION 2
All political power is inherent in the people. Government
is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people,
and they have a right to alter or reform the same whenever the
public good may require.
"Article 1 of the Constitution is the declaration of rights.
Section 2 thereof states: 'All political power is inherent in the
people. Government is instituted for the protection, security
and benefit of the people, and they have a right to alter or re-
form the same whenever the public good may require.' The
people of this state are the sole authority in determining whether
the proposed change is such as is required by the public good.
Unless limited by some provision of the federal constitution,
or Self-limited by provisions of our own constitution, such as
the compact with the United States, or methods of amendment,
the people of this state are supreme in determining what their
Constitution shall be. They have plenary power, by Constitu-
tional amendment, to provide such method of government for
the state or any portion thereof as they please, so long as there
is no violation of the federal relations....
While the provisions of article 1, by positive direction in
§ 24, are declared to be 'expected out of the general powers of
government and shall forever remain inviolate,' this restriction
is a limitation on legislation only; it does not hamper the people
in amending the Constitution whenever they deem it necessary
for the public good, and thus they may amend article 1 unless
prohibited as heretofore stated." Burr, J., in LARKIN v. GRON-
NA,, SECRETARY OF STATE, 69 N. D. 234, 240, 285 N. W. 59,
62 (1939).
"Constitutions are adopted to insure a stable system of
government... .such Constitutions are a means empl6yed by the
sovereign people to limit the powers of their agents, especially
those of the legislative department. When a method of sub-
mitting amendments to the Constitution, originating in the
legislative assembly, is provided, that body, in framing and
submitting them to the electors for ratification or rejection,
does not act in its legislative capacity, but as the agent of the
sovereign people appointed by and through the terms of the
organic law." Spalding, Ch. J., in STATE EX REL. MILLER
V. TAYLOR, 22 N. D. 362, 367, 133 N. W' 1046, 1048 (1911).
Hence, a proposal to amend the constitution by locating an ad-
ditional normal school at Minot did not violate any constitutional
limitation on the power of the legislature. STATE EX REL.
MILLER V. TAYLOR, SUPRA.
The reservation of political power in the people prohibitsi
the court as well as the legislature from interfering with pro-
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posed constitutional amendments. However, where the proposed
amendment is submitted under a constitutional provision which
calls for future legislative action to make the constitutional pro-
vision effective, the court will intervene and enjoin submission of
the void proposal. STATE EX REL. LINDE V. HALL, 35 N. D.
34, 159 N. W. 281 (1916). But "there is a broad line of de-
marcation between judicial interference with sovereign agencies
of the people, in other departments of the government .... and
a judicial interference with this exercise of the sovereign power
of the people themselves, acting in their own right and pursuant
to a power expressly reserved to them." Broson, J. (concurring
opinion), in STATE EX REL. BYERLEY V. STATEI BOARD OF
CANVASSERS, 44 N. D. 126, 158, 172 N. W. 80, 94 (1919).
Hence, as a general rule, the court will not pass on the constitu-
tionality of a proposed initiated measure, -ANDERSON V. BYRNE,
62 N. D. 218, 242 N. W. 687 (1932); and the same principle
applies to a proposed constitutional amendment. The supreme
court will not entertain an original writ to compel a state board
to canvass the votes in a particular manner. In carrying out
their duties the board exercises a political function as agents
of the people. STATE EX REL. BYERLEY V. STATE BOARD
OF CANVASSERS, SUPRA.
Of course, in the broadest sense, the people act through
the legislature, and expressions of their will in the form of
statutes can be questioned by the courts "only for two reasons,
VIZ: (1) that it is contrary to a provision-or provisions of the
Constitution of the state; (2) that it contravenes a provision
or provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
"If a law duly enacted. .. is not invalid for either of the
causes above stated, it stands as an expression of the supreme
will of the people of this state, and, under the Constitution, the
courts have neither authority nor power to declare it invalid."
Grace, J., in DALY V. BEERY, 45 N. D. 287, 292, 178 N. W.
104, 105 (1920); and see STATE EX REL. LINDE V. TAYLOR,
33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L.R. A. 1918B. 156, Ann. Cas. 1918A.
583 (1916).
This section restates a fundamental principle found in all
democratic governments-it is a government by and for the
people. Clearly the interests of those who hold office or seek
authority are of minor importance when considered in the light
of the declared purpose of the Constitution." Burke. Ch. J., In
STATE EX REL. SATHRE V. MOODIE, 65 N. D. 340, 361, 258
N. W. 558, 561 (1935).
SECTION 3
The state of North Dakota is an inseparable part of the
American union, and the constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land.
"The second paragraph of article 6 of the Constitution of
the United States... provides: 'This Constitution, and the laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...
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shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'
"Section 3 of our own Constitution states: 'The state of North
Dakota is an inseparable part of the American Union, and the
Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.'
"Therefore, whenever an agency or instrumentality of the
United States is lawfully operating in this state under a law of
Congress, the court takes judicial notice of the law itself and its
scope." Burr, J., in Regional Rgri. Credit Corp. v. Stewart, 69
N. D. 694, 698, 289 N. W. 801, 803 (1940).
And see State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N. D. 68, 90, 256
N. W. 377 (1934)), holding that conviction in a Federal court of
an offense which is only a misdemeanor in North Dakota, but is
a felony under Federal law, disqualifies an office holder under
Section 127 of our Constitution.
SECTION 4
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference shall be forever
guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered incom-
petent to be a witness or juror on account of his opinion on mat-
ters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby se-
cured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness,
or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this
state.
'The civil authority, both legislative and judicial, are travers-
ing, under our Constitutions, both national and state, in forbidden
and prohibited territory when they assume to legislate, or to in-
terpret laws which undertake to define and interpret doctrinal
and ecclesiastical questions, so as to be binding upon individuals
or interfere with the determination of the individual conscience
with reference thereto." Grace, J., in Bendewald v. Ley 39 N. D.
272, 283, 168 N. W. 693, 696 (1918). In the instant case the court
held that the constitution deprived it of jurisdiction to determine
whether a schism had occurred when part of the congregation
withdrew from one synod of the Lutheran Church and joined an-
other, voting to sell the church property to the new group for
one dollar. "We are clear that all such disputes... should not be
decided by the civil courts, but by some ecclesiastical authority...
The civil courts have jurisdiction to determine property rights
between different religious organizations the same as between
other persons or parties where there is not presented with the
question of. property right questions of heresy, schism, or ques-
tions of church polity, doctrinal beliefs, etc., upon which must be
decided, and upon which right to the property is dependent." Id.
39 N. D. 291, 168 N. W. 699.
Section 147 of the state Constitution provides ,that all public
schools "shall be open to all children of the state of North Dakota
and free from sectarian control ... ." Taken in connection with
Section 4, it is held that the constitution does not prohibit the em-
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ployment of members of a religious order having certificates
authorizing them to teach in the public schools, although they
may wear a distinctive garb and contribute their entire earnings
to the order to which they belong. Gerhardt v. Heidt, 66 N. D.
444, 267 N. W. 127 (1936).
"The state has no concern with or control over the religious
faith or belief of its citizens, except that of protecting each citizen
in the enjoyment of the religious liberty guaranteed by the con-
stitution. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which the
government of our nation and state rests recognizes that while
it is the duty of the state to establish free schools, open to every
child, nevertheless there is no 'general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only;' that 'the child is not the mere creature of
the state;' and that 'those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations.' Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U. S. 510, 535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 1078, 45 S. Ct. 571, 39 A. L. R.
468.
"It-follows from the plain language of the provisions of our
constitution that a parent has the right to instruct and guide his
own children in religious training and that the state has no right
to interfere therewith either directly, or indirectly, by means of
sectarian instruction or exercises in the public schools; also that
no person has the right to ask that the state through its school
system, either directly or indirectly, impose upon other children
the religious views which he holds and desires to have taught to
his children." Id. Christianson, J., in 66 N. D. 458, 267 N. W. 134.
"We are all agreed that the wearing of the religious habit...
does not convert the school into a sectarian school.... Such habit,
it is true, proclaimed that the wearers were members of a certain
denominatitonal organization, but so would the wearing of the
emblem of the Christian Endeavor Society or the Epworth
League. The laws of the state do not prescribe the fashion of
dress of the teachers in our schools. ...
"The fact that the teachers contributed a material portion
of their earnings to the religious order of which they are mem-
bers is not violative of the constitution. A person in the employ
of the state.. .is not inhibited from contributing money... for the
support of some religious body of which he or she is a member.
To deny the right. . .would in itself constitute a denial of the
right of religious liberty which the constitution guarantees." Id.
66 N. D. 459, 267 N. W. 135.
This section has also been referred to in relation to statutes
regulating the operation of a business on the Sabbath. ". . .all
such statutes, were enacted with the purpose of protecting that
part of the public which consists of a large majority, in the exer-
cise of their varying and different methods of religious worship,
and in recognition of the sacredness of the Christian Sabbath. A
number of the courts of the different states have passed upon this
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question, and have held that this is a Christian nation, and that
laws enacted to prevent the desecreation of the Sabbath are valid
for that reason, notwithstanding Constitutional provisions similar
to § 4, supra .... The courts of practically all other states have
sustained such statutes as a legitimate exercise of the police
power, intended to promote the welfare, morals, and sanitary con-
dition of the people." Spalding, J., in State ex rel. Temple v.
Barnes, 22 N. D. 18, 21, 132 N. W. 215, 216, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.)
114, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 930 (1911).
"People are at liberty to attend the church of their choice or
to continuously remain away from church .... The legislative
assemly has, however, said that in doing so they must not inter-
fere with the purpose of the day, as viewed in the light of the
history of the times, when our Constitution was framed, and the
purpose of the founders. In fact, it may be maintained that the
only effect of Sunday laws like our own is to secure peace and
quiet in the observance of religious ceremonies and worship of an
overwhelming majority of our people. The fact that they happen
to be adherents of the Christian faith may in no manner affect
the principle. The legislature has reached the conclusion that the
performance of ordinary labor and of certain other acts is an in-
fringment upon the right of a great majority of the people to
worship and to observe the day as set apart for that purpose, and
as a day of rest." Id. 22 N. D. 26, 132 N. W. 218.
(Continued in next issue)
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OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In W. E. LaPlante, Pltf. and Respt. vs Implement Dealers Mutual Fire
Insurance Company. etal.. Deft. and Aplts.
That a pre-trial conference held under the provisions of chapter 216,
S.L.N.D. 1943, is not a special proceeding.
That a pre-trial order made under the provisions of sections 1 and 2
of chapter 216, S.L. N. D. 1943 after conference and before trial is subject
to such modification by the judge presiding at the trial of the -case as
the ends of justice may require.
That a pre-trial order made after conference and before trial under
the provisions of sections 1 and 2, chapter 216, S.L. 1943, is not appealable
order.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Holt, J.
APPEAL DISMISSED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, Ch. J.
In Isabel Clark, Pltf. and Applt. vs R. M. Stoudt, Deft. and Respt.
That the duty of keeping the sidewalks of a city free from ice and
snow is upon the municipality itself.
That at common law, neither the owner nor the occupant of premises
abutting on the sidewalk is liable for injuries caused by the natural ac-
cumulation of snow or ice -thereon.
